I continue the study, begun in Blume (1993) , of stochastic strategy revision processes in large player populations where the range of interaction between players is small. Each player interacts directly with only a nite set of neighbors, but any two players indirectly interact through a nite chain of direct interactions. The purpose of this paper is to compare local strategic interaction with global strategic interaction when players update their choice according to the (myopic) best-response rule. I show that randomizing the order in which players update their strategic choice is su cient to achieve coordination on the risk-dominant strategy in symmetric 2 2 coordination games. The \persistant randomness" which is necessary to achieve similar coordination when the range of interaction is global is replaced by spatial variation in choice in the initial condition when strategic interactions are local. An extension of the risk-dominance idea gives the same convergence result for K K games with strategic complementarities. Similar results for K K pure coordination games and potential games are also presented.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has tried to understand equilibrium in non-cooperative games as the outcome of a dynamic process of adaptation or evolution in a population of players. Work in this area has tried to identify some particular deterministic population processes, such as replicator dynamics, and study their behavior. Recently several scholars (Blume (1993) , Canning (1990) , Foster and Young (1990) , Kandori, Mailath and Robb (1993), and Young (1993) ) have observed that the qualitative behavior of population dynamics is strikingly di erent when stochastic perturbations are introduced to a deterministic adjustment process. In symmetric two-by-two coordination games, there is a sense in which behavior converges to that equilibrium which has the largest basin of attraction with respect to divergence by opponents from the equilibrium prescription. This is Harsanyi and Selten's risk-dominant equilibrium. The robustness of this result depends upon the way in which randomness is introduced, but the result is common over a rather large class of models. A typical statement is that the stochastic process of the population fraction selecting the risk-dominant strategy is ergodic, and as the noise term becomes small, the limit distribution converges to point mass at 1.
The introduction of persistant randomness is typically motivated either by appeal to uctuations in the populations of players predisposed to play one way or another, or to bounded rationality in a xed population of individual players, or to players' experimenting as they learn how to play. But whatever the source, the randomness must persist in order for the limit result to hold. 1 The interpretation of these results is not so straightforward. Even with very little noise, it will be the case that, in nitely often, the fraction of the population choosing the risk-dominated strategy will be arbitrarily large. Of course the same statement can be made for the risk-dominant strategy. The limit result merely re ects the fact that relatively more time will be spent near risk-dominance than away from it as the noise term shrinks. But the population's behavior never really settles down.
In this paper I will explore an alternative dynamic; that of best-response strategy revision (without stochastic perturbations) where each player interacts not with the entire player population but only with her neighbors, and players will always choose a best-reply to their immediate environment. I will compare local and global strategic interaction in best-response strategy revision in 2 2 and K K coordination games, games with strategic complementarities and potential games. Although the processes studied here are not ergodic, we will see a strong tendency to settle at the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2 2 coordination games. Extensions of this criterion identify likely rest-points in the other game types.
This paper continues my study of local strategic interaction begun in Blume (1993) . In 1
In fact, the results in Blume (1993) still hold if the noise damps out at a su ciently slow rate, but the analysis fails if the noise disappears quickly enough. This will also be true for global strategic interaction with a nite player population. models with local interaction, each player interacts with only a few \neighboring players" rather than the entire population of players. However each player is indirectly connected to a every other player in the population through a chain of neighborhood relations. Thus it is possible for a particular strategic choice to propagate from some favorable locale through the entire population. The justi cation for studying economic models with local interaction is self-evident. Many economic institutions, such as markets for retail services and markets where transportation costs, are characterized by local interaction. In biological models local interaction can be viewed as a model of viscosity. The term \viscosity" was introduced by Hamilton (1964) to describe the phenomenon common to many organisms that most of their interactions with other organisms of the same species will be with members of their kin group. Since an organism's kin will be more likely to share the same characteristics than will the population at large, a consequence of viscosity is that organisms will tend to interact more with other organisms that are like themselves. In a game-theoretic approach to viscosity, Myerson, Pollack and Swinkels (1992) have modelled viscosity as an increased likelihood that a player in a symmetric game will be matched with another member of the player population playing the same strategy as he is. In the model studied here, members of a large player population interact only with a small xed set of players. A di erent approach to viscosity in a dynamic model of strategic interaction is taken by Oechssler (1993) . Bergstrom (1993) provides an evolutionary argument based on kin selection in favor of a criterion that looks much like risk-dominance in 2 2 games. Anderlini and Ianni (1993) compare some di erent dynamics for local strategic interaction. Deterministic dynamic models of strategy revision with local interaction have been studied by Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1993) . Finally, Ellison (1993) has compared convergence rates of local and global interaction models with stochastic perturbations.
The class of strategy revision processes studied in this paper is introduced in the next section, and section 3 provides some general discussion of their invariant measures and asymptotic behavior. Two-by-two coordination games is the subject of section 4. The case of \nearest neighbor interaction" is worked out in some detail, and some general results are also shown. Global and local interaction are compared, and strategy revision processes with mixtures of local and global interaction are studied. Some simulation results are also presented to illustrate the results. Finally, rates of convergence are for local and global interaction are compared; it is shown that convergence is faster with global interaction than with local interaction. Section 5 takes up, in order, K K coordination games, games with strategic complementarities and potential games. The more opaque proofs are left to section 6.
The Model
The model of strategic interaction presented here is that of Blume (1993) , but specialized to best-response strategy revision. Each site on the 2-dimensional integer lattice Z 2 is the address of one player. There is a symmetric neighborhood relation , where s t means that s and t are neighbors. The neighbors of site 0 are a set V 0 = fs : s 0g. The neighborhood relationship is translation-invariant: s t if and only if t ? s 2 V 0 . (Notice that translation invariance of the neighborhood relation and its symmetry imply that V 0 is symmetric to re ection through the origin.) The set of neighbors of s is denoted V s . I will represent the neighborhood relation by a graph whose vertices are the sites in Z 2 and whose edges connect neighbors. At some points I will take the player set to be B(N) A player who has chosen an action w receives a payo ow from each of his neighbors determined by w and by each neighbor's choice of action. She receives instantaneous payo G(w; v) from a given neighbor if she plays action w while that neighbor plays action v. Her instantaneous payo from playing strategy w is the sum of the instantaneous payo s received from playing w against each of her neighbors. The total payo ow to player s from playing w 2 W when the play of the population is described by the con guration A best-response strategy revision process is a continuous time Markov process on the space of con gurations which describes the evolution of players' choices through time. The process works as follows. All players have i.i.d. Poisson \alarm clocks". At randomly chosen moments (exponentially distributed with mean 1) a given player's alarm goes o . When it does, she responds to her neighbors' current con guration by choosing an action which maximizes her instantaneous payo P t2V s G ? w; (t) , where is the current con guration of the population's play. When there is more than one best response, the player will draw from an equiprobable distribution on the set of best responses. However, this situation will not arise in this paper. I assume throughout the paper that for all con gurations there is a unique action br(s; ) which maximizes is an open and dense set of matrices for which hypothesis will be true for all possible neighborhood speci cations, and a residual set of matrices for which this is true for all nite neighborhoods V 0 in the plane Z 2 . The kind of choice behavior described above is boundedly rational in several di erent ways. For discussion, see Blume (1993) and Kandori, Mailath and Robb (1993) .
Con gurations in which each player chooses a best response to the play of her neighbors are of special importance.
De nition 2.1: A con guration is a Nash Con guration if, for all s, (s) = br(s; ).
Imagine a one-shot, simultaneous-move game wherein the payo to player s of choosing w when the play of all the other players is described by is P t2V s G ? w; (t) . A Nash con guration is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this \lattice game".
The state space for all strategy revision processes is the Borel space X of con gurations with the product discrete topology. The best-response strategy revision process is a Markov process on X. The formalities of constructing the process can be found in Blume (1993 
Invariant Distributions
The analysis of Markov jump processes on nite state spaces is not hard because they jump at discrete points in time. Let i denote the time of the ith jump. If X(t) is the (continuous time) Markov process, then X( i ) is a (discrete-time) Markov chain, sometimes referred to as the embedded chain. The invariant distributions and ergodic behavior of X( i ) are precisely that of X(t).
Let P denote the transition matrix for the embedded chain: P( ; ) = 1 Notice that con gurations in which no sites best-respond to the play of their neighbors have probability 0 under every invariant distribution. Thus con gurations in which each player chooses a strongly dominated strategy are 0-probability con gurations. Inductively it can be seen that any invariant distribution must concentrate all its mass on those con gurations wherein each player chooses an iteratively undominated strategy. As is usual with nite Markov Chains, the state space can be partitioned into the transient states and a nite number of ergodic sets. The ergodic distributions are the extreme points of the convex set of invariant measures, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between ergodic distributions and ergodic sets; the ith ergodic distribution puts all its mass on the ith ergodic set. The set of transient states is probability 0 under any invariant distribution. For example, consider the symmetric game with payo matrix The top three-by-three submatrix is the payo matrix for \Rock, Scissors Paper". Strategy 4 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, and strategy 5 is strongly dominated. The set f5g is transient, and the ergodic sets are f1; 2; 3g and f4g. The distribution 1 that assigns probability 1 to the Nash con guration (s) 4 is invariant, and there is a unique invariant distribution 0 with support f1; 2; 3g. The invariant distributions for the bestresponse strategy revision process are the distributions = 1 +(1? ) 0 . In the games considered in this paper, the ergodic sets will be single Nash con gurations, and interest centers on identifying the basins of attraction of each set.
The necessary and su cient condition of equation (3.1) is not easy to manipulate. But similar computations give other interesting necessary conditions. One such is the following: If is invariant, then for each w 2 W, ? (s) = w) = (br(s; ) = w :
The probability of observing choice w by player s is precisely the probability that w is a best response to the play of s's neighbors. The two events whose probabilities are being measured on the right-and left-hand sides respectively, are identical for Nash con gurations. More generally, for any set of players P and con guration (P) of the play of players in P, Another technique for computing ergodic distributions is to apply the graph-theoretic techniques from the literature on stochastic perturbations of dynamical systems, introduced to game theorists by Foster and Young (1990) , to the problem. Although bestresponse strategy revision has no stochastic perurbations, the restriction of the embedded chain to any ergodic class is a process to which the discrete-time developments of Kandori, Mailath and Robb (1993) and Young (1993) can be applied. It turns out that for the ergodic distribution on the i'th ergodic class X i of con gurations, the probability i ( ) of a given state 2 X i is proportional to the number of -trees in which every transition has positive probability. (This is because in each -tree, the product of the transitions is either 0 or jX i j 1?jX i j .) However I have found no way to actually count thes trees In dynamic strategy revision models with persistent trembles, the focus of the analysis has been to nd ergodic distributions. The ergodic theory of best-response strategy revision processes is typically hopeless | without trembles, there are many absorbing states. The goal of the analysis is to identify when particular absorbing states will be reached. It is generally true that processes with local interaction have more absorbing states then do processes with global interaction. When the box size N is large enough, the only Nash con gurations of best-response strategy revision processes with global interaction are \symmetric con gurations", where each player makes the same choice. Any symmetric con guration which is Nash under global strategy revision is also Nash under local strategy revision, but when strategic interaction is local, asymmetric Nash con gurations may exist as well.
2 2 Coordination Games
The payo matrix G describes a (symmetric) coordination game. That is, if G = w x y z w > y and z > x: then w > x and z > y. Throughout, the \top" strategy, noted strategy 0, will be riskdominant. That is, w ?y > z ?x. In a two-person symmetric coordination game, strategy 0 will be risk-dominant if the probability a player assigns to the event that his opponent is playing strategy 0 which is necessary to leave that player indi erent between strategy 0 and 1 is less than 1=2. Let p denote that probability. Speci cally p = z ? x w ? y + z ? x : Strategy 0 is risk-dominant if and only if p < 1=2, which is true if and only if z?x < w?y. I will refer to this threshold probability p as the cut-o for the payo matrix G. Throughout the remainder of this section I will assume that 0 is risk-dominant.
Nearest Neighbor Interactions
First I take up the special case of l 1 -nearest neighbor interactions on the plane and on the To see this, suppose that each player saw exactly the same distribution of play. Then, due to the unique best-response hypothesis, each player would choose exactly the same thing. Now a priori we do not know that each player sees the same thing, because no player counts himself in computing the distribution of his opponents' play. But if N is large, the beliefs of any two players are very close regardless of the con guration, and a consequence of the unique best response hypothesis again is that they will choose the same thing. those players immediately above and below her, and immediately to her left and right. The cases p < 1=4 and 1=4 p < 1=2 require separate treatment. When the cut-o probability p is less than 1=4, a player will adopt strategy 1 if and only if all of her neighbors have chosen 1. When the cut-o probability p exceeds 1=4, a player will adopt strategy 1 if and only if at least three of her four neighbors play strategy 1.
When p < 1=4, the players coordinate. That is, either everyone ultimately plays 0 or everyone ultimately plays 1.
Theorem 4.1: For the best response strategy revision processes on B(N) and Z 2 with nearest neighbor interaction on the plane and cut-o p < 1=4:
1. On the in nite lattice Z 2 or in any nite box B(N), the best-response strategy revision process coordinates. 2. A su cient condition for almost sure coordination on 0 is that the initial con guration has two neighboring players whose initial choice is strategy 0.
3. If the initial con guration on B(N) has only one site s playing 0, then the probability of coordinating on 0 is 4=5. Conclusion 2 states a strong growth property. If a pair of directly interacting players are playing strategy 0, they can never be induced to switch. Furthermore, their neighbors will switch to 0 when they have a chance, then their neighbors, and so on until the entire plane (or nite box) has switched to 0's. The conclusions of the theorem remain true for processes on d-dimensional lattices, but with critical probability 1=2 d , and the probability of coordinating from a single site becomes 2 d =(2 d + 1)
The interpretation of coordination in B(N) di ers somewhat from that of coordinating in Z 2 . In both cases, \coordinating at 0" means that the limit distribution is point mass at the con guration (s) 0. On B(N), this con guration is actually reached in nite time with probability 1. But on Z 2 this will not be the case. If the initial con guration contains only a nite number of players playing 0, then even when the process coordinates at 0, the con guration at each moment of time contains only a nite number of players choosing 0.
Proof: Let 0 denote the con guration in which all players choose 0, and 1 the con guration in which all players choose 1. Let i denote the point mass on the con guration i . Consider an initial con guration which has at least two neighboring players choosing 0. Neither of these players will ever switch to 1 because each has at least one neighboring 0, which is enough to make 0 a best response. Denote by A the collection of players such that if s 2 A, then (s) = 0 and there is a t 2 V s such that (t) = 0. No player in A will ever leave A. If A = B(N) ( Let 1 denote the time of the rst revision opportunity for s 1 , and k the time of the rst revision opportunity for s k after k?1 . Then the a.s. nite time 1 + : : : + K is an upper bound on the time at which s will adopt strategy 0. Hence starting from any initial con guration with at least two adjacent 0's, the time t distribution of states converges (weakly in the case of Z 2 | the functions whose value is determined by the choice of play for a nite number of players are dense in the space of continuous functions on the space of con gurations) to 0 . Now consider an initial con guration which has only one player s choosing 0 and all remaining players choosing 1. Let denote the time of the rst revision opportunity of s or one of ss neighbors. Players outside V s fsg are choosing 0 and all their neighbors are choosing 0, so t = 0 for all t < . With probability 4=5 the revision opportunity at will belong to some t 2 V s . The player t has a neighbor playing 0, and so she too will switch to 0. The resulting con guration has two adjacent 0's, and so the process will converge to Finally, if the player set is Z 2 and the initial con guration contains an in nite number of isolated 0's, the creation of an adjacent pair of 0's somewhere in nite time is a probability 1 event, so the process converges weakly to 0 .
The updating rule for 1=2 > p 1=4 is di erent from that of the case p < 1=4. Our canonical player in the interior of the box will choose 0 if at least two of her neighbors choose 0. Players at the vertices of B(N) will adopt strategy 1 if and only if both neighbors are playing 1, so for these sites, the appropriate rule is to choose r st to be the minimum among the two neighbors. For players on the boundary but not at the corners, the right updating rule depends upon p. If p > 1=3 then the interior updating rule applies, while if p < 1=3 the vertex updating rule applies.
When p 1=4 the population need no longer coordinate on a single strategy. Nonetheless, the best-response strategy revision process settles down into one of a number of absorbing states. Thus it is meaningful to talk about a limit con guration, and each player's limit choice. Furthermore, the geometry of limit con gurations can be described.
Theorem 4.2: For the best-response strategy revision processes on B(N) with nearest neighbor interaction on the plane and cut-o 1=4 p < 1=2, 1. A con guration is absorbing for the best response strategy revision process is 0 precisely on the union of a nite number of rectangles contained in B(N) such that any two disjoint rectangles are at l 1 -distance at least 3 from each other. The minimum dimension of any rectangle is 2, unless p < 2=3 in which case a 1-by-x or x-by-1 rectangle (with x 2) can exist along the boundary.
2. An absorbing con guration is almost-surely reached from any initial con guration.
Proof: The initial problem is to describe all the absorbing states for the strategy revision process, and show that the process almost surely converges to one of them. The intuition is rather clear. Consider the process of 0's and 1's. Any square of 0's is stable. Any isolated 0 can be made to disappear. In a situation like that pictured below, the top 1 can be made to switch to a 0 (and subsequently, the 1 below it). Such sets are also stable on the boundary. In addition, any single row of 0's is stable if p > 2=3, but not if p < 2=3. If two disjoint rectangles are distance 2 apart, there is a player in between who is playing 1. But she has two neighbors, one from each rectangle, playing 0, and so she will switch to 0 at her next revision opportunity. How do we know that an absorbing state must be reached? Let i denote the time of the i'th alarm-clock ring for the threshold process. Then the process of con gurations f i g is a discrete-time Markov chain. Starting from any initial con guration of this process, we will see that there is a transition to an absorbing states in no more than 4N 2 steps, with probability 1=(4N 2 )!, which is independent of the initial con guration. If this is true, it follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma that the process must reach such a state in nitely often. (In considering rates of convergence it may be comforting to know that these estimates are really crude).
Here is how to reach an absorbing state. For a given initial con guration, ring the alarm clocks of all interior players choosing 1 who are adjacent to two or more 0's. Each player chosen will switch to 0, and perhaps add more players to the list of 1's adjacent to at least two 0's. Also ring the clocks of all boundary players who could switch to 0. Continue ringing until all such players are exhausted. Now ring the clocks of all players choosing 0 who are su ciently isolated that they would switch to 1. When this is nished, the 0-1 con guration is stable. Notice that no site was visited twice, so at most 4N 2 transitions have been made.
Best-response strategy revision with p 1=4 does not have the stochastic growth property of best-response strategy revision with p < 1=4. When p 1=4, a region of 0's in a sea of 1's will grow or shrink into a (possibly empty) rectangle, and the rectangle will be stable.
General Results on Local Interaction
When the radius of interaction is taken to be larger than 1, the character of the analysis for p < 1=4 remains the same. For neighborhoods which are l 1 -spheres of radius k, squares of players with side-length at least k + 1 cannot be made to disappear. Furthermore, any such square must grow. (Start from a player adjacent to a player at the center of a side. She must switch. Then either one of the two players next to her and adjacent to the side will switch : : :.) The following theorem is proved by a straightforward rewriting of the proof of Theorem 4.1. Theorem 4.3: For the best-response strategy revision processes on B(N) with interaction radius k and cut-o p < 1=4:
1. On the in nite lattice Z 2 or in any nite box B(N), the best-response strategy revision process coordinates. 2. A su cient condition for coordinating at 0 is that the initial con guration has a (k + 1) (k + 1) box of players whose initial choice is strategy 0. Surprisingly, this case of \stochastic growth" is the general case. This is the content of the following Theorem, which is the main result on coordination games. Here \general case" means that neighborhoods are any radially symmetric shape and su ciently large.
For a given nite set B of players, let B denote the con guration which is identically 0 on B and 1 on B c .
De nition 4.1: A nite set B of players is stable if, for all s 2 B, Prf t+u (s) = 0 j t = B g = 1. A strategy revision process with parameter p grows from a nite set of players B if,for all s 2 Z 2 , lim t Prf t (s) = 0 j 0 = B g = 1.
Theorem 4.4: : Let C denote a radially symmetric (through 0) subset of R 2 with positive Lebesgue measure and such that the elements of C \ Z 2 span R 2 . Let parametrize bestresponse strategy revision processes with neighborhood V 0 = C \ Z 2 . a) For all 1, if p 1=2 there exist nite stable sets. b) For all 1 there is a nite set B of players and a threshold p( ) < 1=2 such that growth from B takes place for all p < p( ). c) lim !1 p( ) = 1=2. d) For every xed set B of players initially choosing 0, the critical threshold p B ( ) below which growth from this set takes place converges to 0 as increases. The idea of the theorem is to x a basic neighborhood shape and then make the neighborhoods large enough that the bumps due to the discreteness of the lattice are not too important. The Theorem then states that 0 will grow from some nite set of players.
The theorem is proven for the player set Z 2 to emphasize that the size of the neighborhoods can be arbitrarily small relative to the population size, and that the size of the initial region of 0's can also be arbitrarily small. Of course the conclusions hold for large enough boxes B(N), and the critical probability p( ) is independent of N for N large enough.
In higher dimensions the arguments used to show Theorem 4.4 also show that for all p < 1=2 there is a 0 > 0 such that for all > 0 there is a B such that if V 0 = C, then growth from B takes place. Conclusion d) holds as well. I do not have a proof for a) but I would be very surprised if it were false.
Global Interaction and Mixed Regimes
This section records the results for the more commonly studied case of global interaction, and also investigates the robustness of both local and global analysis with respect to mixing the regimes. The model presented in the last Section with players in the box B(N) and an interaction radius so large that the set of neighbors for each player is all the remaining players in B(N) is nearly the model studied by Kandori, Mailath and Robb (1993) but done in continuous time. This model is exactly equivalent to the discrete time model in which at each time t one player is chosen at random who then revises her choice according to the best-response strategy revision rule. The only information needed from the con guration for evaluating best-response strategy revision is the frequency of 0's and 1's. For purposes of comparison to local best-response strategy revision it is convenient to draw initial con gurations randomly and ask after the probability of observing a sample path of the process which converges to the con guration 0. I will assume that the initial con guration of the population is assigned by an independent draw for each player from a distribution with a probability of realizing strategy 0.
For any given cuto p, a player will choose 0 when she has the opportunity if and only if at least (4N 2 ? 1)p other players have chosen 0. (Actually, we should be careful about the treatment of \ties" in the payo s of the two strategies, but they do not really matter for what follows.) The process coordinates. That is, the process converges to a con guration where all players are choosing the same strategy. For given the probability that the population coordinates at 0 is the probability that the empirical frequency of 0's in a draw from the binomial distribution b(4N 2 ; ) is at least p. As N gets large, this converges to 0 or 1 depending upon whether is less than or greater than p. Comparing Theorem 4.4 with Theorem 4.5, we see that local best-response and global best-response strategy revision processes in coordination games are very di erent. With large enough neighborhoods in su ciently large boxes, an initial small region of 0's will take over. For example, calculations show that if the radius of interaction is 5 and p < :42, an initial disk of 0's of radius 14 will grow and take over any given area. This disk contains 636 players. Making N, the size of the box, as large as we want, we see that there are initial con gurations wherein the initial fraction of 0's is vanishingly small, (26=N) 2 , which ultimately coordinate at 0 with local best-response. But with global best-response, the initial fraction of 0's must be at least p. Since the behavior of the two processes is qualitatively di erent, it is important to examine mixed regimes where both local and global interaction is present in order to test the robustness of the results.
There are many di erent ways of parametrizing mixed regimes. One simple way is to suppose that when the frequency of 0's in the entire population isp G and the frequency of 0's in the neighborhood of player s isp s , player s best-responds to the distribution A generalization of this idea is to assume that the e ects of interaction are distanceweighted. Here identical weights correspond to global interaction, and weights that are 1 for players inside V s and 0 for players outside V s corresponds to local interaction. The qualitative features of the e ects of parameter variation here are more complicated, but not di erent in character from the simpler parametrization with .
The second claim follows from the fact that if , p and^ are con gured as indicated, then even if V s contains only 0's, the average will have strategy 1 preferred to strategy 0.
Simulations
The analysis of best-response strategy revision developed above derives conclusions based on the structure of the initial con guration. This analysis is nicely illustrated by simulations of the process on a large box. If the simulations required a separate run for each initial condition there would be no practical way to run them and no useful way to present the results. Fortunately it is possible to \couple" together into one simulation runs for many di erent initial con gurations, and to display the results simultaneously in one picture.
The initial con gurations for the simulations presented here have players within a given distance from the center of the box playing 0, and players farther away choosing 1.
That is, 0 (s) = 0 if and only if jsj < 1. For a given speci cation of the neighborhoods V s and threshold probability p, all of the di erent initial con gurations can be simultaneously simulated. To see how, consider nearest neighbor strategy revision with p < 0:25. Suppose that all players within Euclidean distance k of the origin are initially playing 0, and the rest play 1. Consider the rst switching opportunity, and suppose that it occurs for player (i; j) who is initially playing 1. He will continue to play 1 only if all of his neighbors are playing 1; that is, only if all of his neighbors are at least distance k from the origin. If, on the other hand, he is initially playing 0, he will continue to play 0 if and only if his neighbor nearest to the origin is playing 0. Now consider the next switch. The rules will be the same, unless the rst player is in the second player's neighborhood. So here the rule of play is governed by the distances of the second player's neighbors from the origin and the distance from the origin of the neighbor of the rst player nearest to the origin. This suggests the following scheme. Label each player with his distance from the origin. When a revision opportunity arises, relabel the chosen player with the lowest label from among his neighbors. So the rst player chosen will be assigned the lowest label of his neighbors. The second player chosen will be assigned the lowest label of his neighbors. if the rst player is not a neighbor of the second player, then the second player will be assigned the label of his neighbor nearest to the origin. If the rst player is a neighbor of the second, the second player will be assigned the minimum distance to the origin from among his neighbors and the rst player's neighbors, and so forth. Ultimately a labelling will be reached from which no further changes are possible. These are the data presented in the tables and gures. To interpret them, suppose we wanted to see what would have happened if the initial con guration had assigned 0's only to those players within Euclidean distance 5 from the origin. Map the labels into 0's and 1's by assigning a 0 to those sites with label less than or equal to ve, and 1's to all remaining sites. To see what happened had the initial Euclidean ball of 0's had radius 10, assign 0's to all players with labels less than or equal to 10, and 1's to the rest. For larger interaction neighborhoods, the idea is the same: Order the neighborhood's sites by their labels and choose the pth fractile of the distribution.
The results of some simulations are reported in Table 1. Table 1 answers the question, \How big an initial neighborhood of 0's is required for the population of a 41 41 box to coordinate at 0?" for best-response strategy revision on a 41-by-41 box. Table 1 reports the size of the initial Euclidean ball of 0's necessary to achieve coordination. The top number is the square of the radius of the Euclidean ball, and the bottom number is the percentage of players in the 41-by-41 box who are in this region. Asterisks indicate that no meaningful coordination was attained. Obviously in any nite box coordination is attained at some level, for instance, if the initial sphere is so large that it contains the entire box. The test of \meaningful coordination" employed here is that the the region of 0's is thicker than the neighborhood radius. Another useful test is to check if the simulation results are insensitive to box size. The table entries marked with double daggers changed only slightly when simulated in a 61-by-61 box. The table entries marked with a single dagger changed more dramatically with the increase in box size. Table 1 illustrates the conclusions of Theorem 4.4. For any given threshold p, coordination at 0 is ultimately realized for some su ciently large initial region of 0's. As the threshold probability p increases, the size of the required initial region of 0's grows. Reading down columns demonstrates part d of Theorem 4.4. The initial region of 0's necessary to sustain growth grows with the size of the neighborhood.
The asterisk entries in Table 1 are those combinations of radii and cuto probabilities for which no meaningful coordination takes place. The picture of these simulations is similar to the situation described by Theorem 4.2. The limit con guration of radii form a nexted sequence of polygons, each only 1 or 2 units wider than the one preceding, which indicate convergence to distinct stable sets starting from the di erent initial conditions. The radius of the outermost stable set is very nearly half the side length of the box.
The data from Table 1 shows that as the cuto probability increases, the percentage of players inthe initial 0 set grows at an ever increasing rate. However the growth curves become more nearly linear as as the radius of the interaction neighborhood increases. Notice that even when the neighborhood radius is large, the fraction of initial 0's is signi cantly less than the threshold probability. Table 2 also shows the e ect of changing the neighborhood radius on the size of the set of initial 0's necessary to achieve coordination at 0. Again the qualitative picture is that the di erential e ects of various cuto probabilities are most evident at larger radii. Table 2 demonstrates the e ects of di erent box sizes on processes with interaction radius 10 and three di erent cuto probabilities: 0:325, 0:375, and 0:425. The table indicates both the size of the initial region of 0's (measured as the square of the Euclidean radius) necessary to achieve coordination, and the (smaller sizes) at which distinct stable sets emerge.
I have not reported any variations in these region sizes. This is for good reason.
Within limits, there is and should be very little. Suppose an initial region of 0's is given from which the set of 0's cannot shrink. Then it is easy to see that the limit con guration is independent of the order in which the di erent players have strategy revision opportunities. To see this, consider two distinct processes, process 1 and process 2, with identical initial conditions, and run them at the same time. Ultimately both will reach a limit conguration. The paths in con guration space for both processes have the property that the set of players playing 0 at time t is a subset of the set of players playing 0 at time t 0 > t. Consider the rst player s 1 who switched from 1 to 0 in process 1. The neighbors playing 0 at the time of the switch are just members of the initial region of 0's, so they are 0's in the process 2 limit con guration. Hence if this player had a strategy revision opportunity in process 2, an almost certain event, she switched to 0. Suppose this switch took place at time t 1 . Now consider s 2 , the second player who switched to 0 in process 1. The set of players choosing 0 at the time she switched was the 0-set of the initial con guration and s 1 . These players are all playing 0 in process 2 after time t 1 . So if s 2 has a revision opportunity after time t 1 , an almost certain event, then she will switch to 0. Proceeding inductively shows that the limit 0 set for process 2 contains the limit 0 set for process 1.
Interchanging the roles of the two processes shows that the limit con gurations must be identical.
Rates of Convergence
In comparing the local and global results, the obvious question is why is the basin of attraction for coordination at the risk-dominant strategy so much larger with local interactions than it is with global interaction. Intuitively, emergence of risk dominance with either local or global strategic interaction depends on the existence of an initial \critical density" of players choosing the risk-dominant strategy. But global interaction requires that this critical density be achieved globally; that is, the critical density must be achieved throughout the entire player space. Local interaction only requires that the critical density be achieved in some small locality in the player space. If this critical density is achieved anywhere, the neighborhood \ lls in", so that localy the density of the risk-dominant strategy goes to 1. When the local density is su ciently high, the critical density is achieved for neighborhoods of players which are just outside the initial locality. These players switch to the risk-dominant strategy, and it is in this manner that the risk-dominant strategy spreads. The picture described by the proof of Theorem 4.4 has the boundary between 0's and 1's moving like a travelling wave. The ball of 0's spreads until it covers the entire box or plane. This contrasts with the evolution of states in global strategy revision. With global best-response strategy revision each player makes her nal choice at the rst strategy revision opportunity. At every subsequent revision opportunity she will decline to change her mind; her rst choice is still a best response. This means that convergence is very fast. Let N g denote the rst time that coordination is achieved in the box B(N).
Theorem 4.7: Suppose that the initial fraction of the players playing strategy 0 ex-ceeds p. Then N g =2 log N ! 1 almost surely.
Theorem 4.7 shows that the waiting time until coordination at 0 in the box B(N) grows like log N. The story for local interaction is very di erent. Suppose that p is such that the set of players choosing 0 grows from a nite stable set of players B as described by Theorem 4.4. Let B denote the con guration in which all players in the set B play 0 and all other players play 1. All revisions will be from 1 to 0. A player once having chosen 0 will never revert. For initial con gurations in this class the best-response strategy revision is a growth process. The following Theorem can be proven in the same manner that Durrett (1988) proves the same theorem for a proportional stochastic growth model. Theorem 4.8: Suppose that p is such that 0 grows in a given local best-response strategy revision process from an initial con guration B (with B stable). There exists a closed, convex set C in R 2 such that for all > 0 Pr ? (1 ? )tC fs : t (s) = 0g (1 + )tC ! 1 as t ! 1:
The time it will take the process to coordinate at 0 in a large enough box B(N) is bounded by the time it takes the sets (1 )tC to cover the box, which grows like N. Letting N l denote the time at which coordination at 0 rst occurs in the box B(N) we see that 0 < lim
Thus coordination at 0 takes longer to achieve with local interaction than it does with global interaction. This result may seem counterintuitive to those who have read Ellison (1993) . Ellison shows that with stochastic perturbation, the convergence rate for local best-response strategy revision is much shorter than for global best-response strategy revision. Both Ellison's results and the rate results presented here have their origin in the same phenomenon, the fast rate of convergence of best-response strategy revision. When mutations are present, the convergence rates are governed by the time spent waiting for mutations. Suppose a stochastically perturbed best-response strategy revision process with infrequent deviations from best-response is at a state near coordination at 1. A certain number of mutations need to occur before 0 becomes a best-response. If the mutation rate is small, the waiting time for these mutations will be much greater than the time it takes the best response dynamic to drive the process near to coordination at 0. Ellison's observation is that, when interaction is local, it takes fewer mutations to make 0 a best response in some region of the player set from which it can grow. With global interaction, the waiting time for best-response to \take over" is much longer than it is with local interaction. Here I have shown that when best-response takes over, it works quicker with global interaction than with local interaction, but this is second-order to the di erences in time spent waiting for enough mutations in Ellison's calculations.
K K Games
The analysis presented so far considers only the very special case of two-by-two coordination games. That analysis has shown how viscosity drives the best-response dynamic to achieve a particular equilibrium con guration. On a nite box, the strategy revision process looks like a discrete-time Markov chain on a nite state space, and so it will have a limit distribution. In considering more general classes of games, two questions need to be addressed. When is this limit distribution connected to Nash equilibrium in some interesting way? Secnd, for those games in which the limit distribution is concentrated on Nash con gurations, when is an equilibrium selection principle operative, and what is it? Section 3 provides a general characterization of invariant distributions, but does not directly address either question. There are, however, three interesting classes of games for which the invariant distributions are concentrated on Nash con gurations: K-by-K coordination games, potential games and games with strategic complementarities.
K-By-K Pure Coordination Games
The theory of 2-by-2 coordination games carries over in a straightforward way to K-by-K pure coordination games. A pure coordination game is a symmetric game in which all nondiagonal payo s are 0, and diagonal payo s are positive. For these games each strategy has its own cuto p i , the minimum probability with which i must appear in an opponent's play in order to induce a player to choose i regardless of the play of others. In this case, payo dominance and risk dominance coincide | the smallest cuto goes to the strategy with the highest payo . Furthermore, this cuto will be less than or equal to 1=2.
Suppose that the rst strategy, strategy 0, has the lowest p i . Then the conclusions of Theorem 4.4 still hold, an can be proved by exactly the same arguments. If the neighborhood size is large enough to smooth out discreteness e ects, and if the initial disk of 0's is su ciently large, then almost half the neighbors of any player near to this disk will be playing 0, and so that player too will switch to 0. More generally, consider any two-person game G such that (0; 0) is a Nash equilibrium. Now consider the lattice game and the payo matrix G such that G )(i; j) = G(i; j) for (i; j) 6 = (0; 0), and G (0; 0) = G(0; 0) + .
Then for su ciently large the conclusions of Theorem 4.4 are true.
Games with Strategic Complementarities
Games with strategic complementarities have proven to be important for a number of applications. A (symmetric) game G has strategic complementarities if for all strategy choices 0 i < j jWj, G(j; k) ? G(i; k) is non-decreasing in k. I rely on the fact that for such games the best response correspondence is monotonic with respect to stochastic dominance. Let 1 and 2 be two probability distributions on W such that for all w 2 W, 1 fv : v wg 2 fv : v wg. Then 2 stochastically dominates ( rst order) 1 , and the best responses to 2 are no smaller than the best responses to 1 .
Theorem 5.1: The ergodic distributions of the best-response strategy revision process on B(N) in a game of strategic complementarities are precisely the point masses on Nash con gurations. For every initial distribution of states 0 there is a 1 such that t ! 1 .
Proof: I will show that, starting from any con guration, a Nash con guration must be reached in nite time with probability 1. The convergence to a limit distribution follows from this fact, since the ergodic classes are singletons. Order the players in the box in some given way, choose an initial con guration, and consider the following sequence of events. First, cycle through the players in order, selecting those players in order from among those players whose best response to their neighbors' play is less than their current play. Because of the monotonicity of best responses with respect to stochastic dominance , any player moving up may cause his neighbor to desire to move up, but never to move down. Now cycle through again in the same fashion, and continue to do so until no player wishes to move down any further. (The number of revisions is bounded by the number of players times the number of strategies.) Now cycle through the players in order, selecting those players who wish to move up. (Again monotonicity guarantees that any one player moving up will cause other players to move up, but not down. Continue cycling through until no one wishes to move up. (Again the number of necessary revisions is bounded by the number of players times the number of strategies.) The resulting con guration is a Nash con guration: No one wishes to move down, and no one wishes to move up. Since the number of player selections is uniformly bounded (independently of the starting con guration), this sequence of events must occur with a positive probability which can be positively bounded from below independently of the initial con guration. Conclude from the Borel-Cantelli lemma that it will happen sometime, and so an equilibrium will be reached.
One consequence of this fact is that for stochastically perturbed best-response strategy revision, such as that in Blume (1993) and Kandori, Mailath and Robb (1993) , if the perturbations are small the limit distribution of the process (which is unique because of the perturbations) puts most of its weight on the set of Nash con gurations.
In games with strategic complementarities there is a Nash con guration in which all players choose the smallest iteratively undominated strategy, and a Nash con guration in which all players choose the largest iteratively undominated strategy. When the strategic complementarities are strict, all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the two-person game are symmetric, and these are the only Nash con gurations that can arise with global strategic interaction. But when interaction is local, other asymmetric Nash con gurations can arise which do not re ect any mixed Nash equilibrium of the two-person game. Consider the payo matrix . Con gurations such as 0; : : : ; 0; 1; 2 : : : ; 2; 1; 0; : : :] are Nash con gurations, because 1 is the best response to the mixture of 0 with probability 1=2 and 2 with probability 1=2, 0 is the best response to the mixture of 0 with probability 1=2 and 1 with probability 1=2, and 2 is the best response to the mixture of 1 with probability 1=2 and 2 with probability 1=2. The only Nash equilibria for the two-person game are the pure strategy combinations (0; 0) and (2; 2). Thus if the neighborhood size is su ciently large the only Nash con gurations are (s) 0 and (s) 2.
This example illustrates the claim of section 3 that processes with local strategic interaction have more absorbing states than do processes in which the interaction is global. The following Theorem gives some information on where di erent con gurations go. For con gurations and write if (s) (s) for all s 2 B(N). Theorem 5.2: Let f t g t 0 and f t g t 0 denote two best-response strategy revision processes for a payo matrix G with strategic complementarities. Let t and t denote their respective time-t marginal distributions on the state space. If 0 0 , then t rst-order stochastically dominates t for all t.
This Theorem compares the paths of two processes starting from comparable initial conditions. If the process initially has higher choices for each player than does the process, then at all subsequent dates, the probability of high choices by each player under the process exceeds the probability of high choices under the process. 4 Theorem 5.2 is a speci c case of a more general Theorem whose statement and proof is in the last section. The conclusion is independent of the interaction structure, and is also robust to the addition of state-independent trembles.
The monotonicity of the best response correspondence with respect to stochastic dominance suggests that all players should move up or down together. The last theorem states that if the play at two sites is initially uncorrelated or positively correlated, the correlation cannot reverse over time. Formally, a distribution is said to have positive correlations if R fg d R f d R g d for all non-decreasing functions f and g. Suppose that a distribution of states in the best-response strategy revision process had positive correlations.
Take f( ) to be the indicator function for the event \s plays a strategy greater than or equal to v" and g( ) to be the indicator function for the event \t plays a strategy greater than or equal to w". These functions are increasing. Applying the inequality, we get that ( (s) v j (t) w) ( (s) v), the statement that t choosing high does not decrease the probability that s will choose high.
Theorem 5.3: Suppose that f t g t 0 is a best-response strategy revision process for a payo matrix with strategic complementarities. If the initial distribution of con gura-4
Recall the de nition of rst-order stochastic dominance. Suppose the state-space is partially ordered. The distribution dominates if for every function f which is nondecreasing with respect to the order, R f d R f d . In our setting, indicator functions which are 1 if player s chooses a strategy v at least as big as some given w and 0 otherwise are non-decreasing with respect to the partial order. tions has positive correlations, then for all t the marginal distribution of t has positive correlations. Notice that positive correlations for 0 includes those distributions such that the random variables 0 (s) for s 2 B(N) are mutually independent. This theorem too is a corollary of the general result on comparing two strategy revision processes, whose statement and proof can be found in the last section.
Just as in the analysis of pure coordination games, we would like to know when a local concentration of a particular choice is stable and when it can grow. The stochasticdominance monotonicity of best-response correspondences allows for a su cient variety of behaviors that it is not always the case that a single con guration will be singled out. The selection behavior observable in 2 2 games may not be present in larger games. Nonetheless, an extension of the risk-dominance idea does identify a su cient condition for selecting a particular choice as an equilibrium. The idea is this: To test for convergence to w , rst consider all pairs of strategies v < w where v < w . Look at the mixed strategies that put weight only on v and w, and let p(v; w) denote the minimum weight on w for the best response to be greater than v. Next consider all pairs w < v, where v < w , and let p(v; w) denote the minimum weight on w which induces a best response less than v. Let p denote the maximum of the p(v; w). The essence of the next theorem is that if p is less than 1=2, then for su ciently thick neighborhoods a process starting with a su ciently large region of players choosing w will converge to everyone playing w . Just as in Theorem 4.4, the \su ciently's" are all independent of the size of the player set providing it is large enough. The following theorem is for best-response strategy revision processes on Z 2 .
This condition generalizes the risk-dominance criterion of 2 2 games. In 2 2 games it is risk dominance, for in this case moving higher (or lower) means adopting the other strategy.
Formally, de ne p(v; w) as follows: For all strategies v < w such that v < w , let p(v; w) denote the smallest q such that the best response to the 1 ? q : q mixture of v and w exceeds v. For all strategies v > w such that v > w , let p(v; w) denote the smallest q such that the best response to the 1?q : q mixture of v and w is exceeded by v. Following the de nition of section 4, w grows from a nite set B of players in a strategy revision process if lim t Prf t (s) = w j 0 (B) = w g = 1 for all s 2 Z 2 .
Theorem 5.4: Let C denote a radially symmetric subset of R 2 with positive Lebesgue measure, and such that the elements of C \ Z 2 span R 2 . Let parametrize the bestresponse strategy revision processes with neighborhood V 0 = C \ Z 2 . Then for all > 1 there is a nite set B of players and a threshold p( ) < 1=2 such that w grows from B if max v<w p(v; w) < p( ), and lim !1 p( ) = 1=2.
The proof of theorem 5.4 is a straightforward extension of the proof of theorem 4.4. The condition on best-responses is the proper measure of the basin of attraction, and the monotonicity of best-responses guaranteed by the strategic complementarity hypothesis ensures that inspecting a relatively small set of best-responses su ces. The conclusion of the Theorem implies the convergence of the distribution of t in the weak convergence topology to point mass on the con guration in which all players choose w . Call a con guration a local maximum of the potential function P if changing the value of any one coordinate does not increase the potential. The local maxima of P are the Nash con gurations. Since there are only a nite number of con gurations, maxima, and hence pure strategy Nash equilibria, exist. Best-response strategy revision processes are stochastic hill-climbing processes; each step increases the value of the potential. They are not stochastic in the sense that sometimes the process slips down the hill, but stochastic in its choice of local improvement. In summary:
Potential Games
Theorem 5.5: Let G be a symmetric game, and suppose that G has a potential. Then every lattice game on B(N) with neighborhoods fV s g s2B(N) is a potential game with potential P, and every such game has at least one Nash con guration. Furthermore the ergodic distributions are precisely the point masses on the Nash con gurations.
Of course the global maxima of the potential function are appealing objects. They are not necessarily payo dominant Nash con gurations, however. Two-by-two coordination games are potential games, and the global maximum of the potential function has each player choosing the risk-dominant strategy. Blume (1993) examined 2 2 games on Z d .
There the potential function was used to introduce stochastic perturbations, and it was shown that as the perturbations become small, the limit probability on the set of \global maximizers" converges to 1.
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On B(N) it will also be the case that the introduction of small trembles pushes the strategy revision process towards the global maxima. In fact, if the perturbations are damped out over time at a su ciently slow rate, the limit probability on the set of global maximizers is 1. This result is the topic of the simulated annealing literature, and a detailed description of the rate (including rate constants) is available. An interesting project (thankfully not attempted here) is to compare the critical damping rate with various tremble processes that allow for experimentation as part of a learning process.
The following example shows that local maxima which are not global maxima can be stable. The game with payo matrix Now consider the lattice game on the one-dimensional interval 0; : : : ; N] with nearest neighbor interaction. Some checking establishes that the potential-maximizing con guration is (s) 2. But any con guration of the form n (s) = 0 for s < n, (s) = 2 for s > n, and (n) = 1 is a local maximum for 1 < n < N ?1. Although the con gurations n and agree on the set of players n + 1; : : : ; N, it takes two switches to move from n to a con guration with higher potential. An analysis of potential games along the lines suggested by the analysis of games with strategic complementarities is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is possible to derive conditions for potential games analogous to the risk-dominance conditions which guarantee convergence to a global maximum of the potential function.
I will conclude with the following conjecture about the general principle at work in processes with local interaction. It seems that, in large populations with local interaction, local variation in the con guration of play has the same role as stochastic perturbations do in processes with global interaction. The realization of a fortuitous sequence of mutations 5 Global maximizers is in quotes here because, strictly speaking, the concept is not wellde ned since the potential function is given by an in nite series that need not converge. See Blume (1993) for details. is akin to the realization of a region of propitious play. This relationship between viscosity and random perturbations is suggested by the analysis in presented in this paper, but much hard analysis remains to be done to explore the generality of this conclusion.
Proofs
This section collects those proofs that were too tedious or unenlightening to include in the main text.
Proof of Theorem 4.4: a) It su ces to prove this statement for p = 1=2, since if a set C is stable for a given p = p 0 , it is clearly stable for p < p 0 . Fix . The corresponding neighborhoods V s will all be radially symmetric. A consequence of radial symmetry is that any line which bisects V s and goes through s will have at least half the points of V s on each side (including points on the line).
Here is a recipe for constructing a convex polygon which is stable at p = 1=2. Consider the neighborhood V 0 , and let B 0 denote the smallest square which strictly contains it (no points in V 0 are on the boundary of the square). This square has a side length s. Choose a point in the neighborhood V 0 and the corresponding ray r 1 through the point to the origin. Truncate r 1 so that its endpoint is a lattice point and so that the minimum of the absolute values of the coordinates of the endpoint is at least 2s. Call this line l 1 . Choose a point x 1 in the lattice, and translate l 1 so that its origin is x 1 . Call the other endpoint x 2 . Now imagine the neighborhood of x 2 . Extend a ray from x 2 at an angle of radians to the line l 1 . The line and the ray bisect the neighborhood, and each half (counting the boundary, so there is overlap) has at least half the points in the neighborhood. If this ray is rotated clockwise the a su ciently small amount, the number of neighborhood vertices contained in the convex cone formed by the two lines will be exactly half the number of points on the neighborhood. Rotate the ray clockwise the maximal amount so that the convex cone formed by the ray with the line 1 1 contains at least half the points in the neighborhood. In other words, rotate the ray until it intersects another vertex in the neighborhood. Call this ray r 2 . Truncate r 2 according to the same rules used to truncate l 1 , call this line l 2 and its new endpoint x 3 . The radial symmetry of V 0 implies that, continuing in this manner to construct lines l 3 , l 4 , and so forth, the construction will eventually return to x 1 . That is, there is a line l N which has endpoints x N?1 and x 1 . To see this, boserve that, starting from r 1 , the ray is always rotated clockwise until it hits the next point. By radial symmetry, at some point in this procedure the aggregate angle of rotation must be radians. Radial symmetry now implies that the continuation of the procedure will proceed as follows: The next rotation will be through the same angle as the rst rotation, the one following will be through the same angle as the second rotation, and so forth. Eventually additional radians will have been traversed, and the process will have returned to its starting point.
The area enclosed by these N lines is a stable polygon. To see this, observe that the neighborhood of every point in the polygon intersects the boundary along at most two edges (due to the size of the side lengths). The neighborhood of a point will intersect the polygon in the least number of points at a vertex, and the constructions guarantees that at every vertex x, the intersection of the polygon and the neighborhood V x contains at least half the points of V x . b) Consider the stable polygon P constructed in a). For every vertex s within distance 1 of P let p(s) = #V s \ P=#V s. Then for any p min s2P p(s) the process grows. Again it is clear that if growth occurs for p, then it occurs for all p 0 < p. c) We will rescale the set C by looking at C and the lattice (1= )Z 2 . Choose p 1 and p 2 such that 1=2 > p 1 > p 2 > p. First, due to radial symmetry, any hyperplane through the origin divides C into two pieces of equal area. There is a > 0 such that any hyperplane coming within > 0 of the origin contains at least fraction p 1 of the volume of C on each side.
Let S(y; r) denote a disk of radius r centered at y. If r 0 is su ciently large, than for any y and r r 0 , if S(y; r) comes within distance of the origin, then the volume of C \ S(y; r) is at least p 2 . Choose a y and an r. d) This claim is obvious, for if B is xed and is su ciently large, the neighborhood of any point \next to" B will contain all B, and so the frequency of 0's in the neighborhood will be #B=# C, which will go to 0 as grows.
Proof of Theorem 4.7: All players initially choosing 0 will remain at 0 when a revision opportunity arises. Our concern is with the set A of 4(1 ? Proof: The proof is a standard coupling argument and relies on the following Lemma which is well-known in the stochastic dominance literature (Strassen 1965) . We shall use it thrice:
Lemma 6.1: Let X be a compact metric space with a partial ordering such that K = f(x; y) 2 X X : x yg is closed in the product topology. The probability distribution 1 0 , stochastically dominates 2 0 . The lemma guarantees the existence of a coupling measure 0 such that 0 ( ) = 1, and such that the marginal distribution on the rst and second coordinates are 1 0 and 2 0 , respectively. Now consider the evolution of the process on X X with transition probability P and initial distribution . Since 0 ( ) = 1, t ( ) = 1 for all t > 0. The marginal distributions of t on the rst and second coordinates are 1 t and 2 t , respectively, and we conclude from Lemma 6.1 that 1 t stochastically dominates 2 t . The apparatus of in nitessimal operators allows this Theorem to be extended to processes on Z d with in nitessimal generators like those described in Blume (1993) . The application of this Theorem to Theorem 5.2 is clear. Suppose in addition that a distribution of trembles q is xed: q(w) is the probability that, in the event of a tremble, outcome w is drawn. Now consider dynamics in which every player at a revision opportunity chooses the best response with probability 1 ? and draws from q with probability .
Then the stochastic dominance hypothesis is still satis ed, and the conclusions of Theorem 5.2 continue to hold. Theorem 6.1 also contains information about the distribution of play across the player set at any moment of time. A distribution is said to have positive correlations if R fg d R f d R g d for all increasing functions f and g. Suppose that a distribution of states in the best-response strategy revision process had positive correlations. Take f( ) to be the indicator function for the event \s plays a strategy greater than or equal to v" and g( ) to be the indicator function for the event \t plays a strategy greater than or equal to w".
Applying the inequality, we get that ( (s) v j (t) w) ( (s) The conclusion of this theorem applies whenever the initial distribution has assignments of play which are independent across players. This includes beginning at any point-mass.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: The proof of Theorem 5.4 follows the same path as the proof of Theorem with the necessary modi cations for more than two strategies. The necessary modi cations will involving coupling two processes together as in the proof of Theorem 6.1. The two processes will have the same transition rules but di erent initial conditions.
The strategy of the proof is to use the coupling to show that for any s, lim t!1 Prf t (s) w g = 1. A similar coupling shows that lim t!1 Prf t (s) w g = 1, and this completes the proof.
Suppose that the strategies are ordered 0 < 1 < : : : < w < : : : < w. We start with a given , and let r 0 = maxfjxj : x 2 C \ Z 2 g. For a given neighborhood V 0 = C there is a sphere B w of radius r su ciently large such that if s is within l 1 distance 1 from the sphere and if p is a su ciently small number, #V s \ B w =#V s p. De ne p( ) to be the supremum of the numbers p for which this inequality is true. As before, as grows, p( ) converges to 1=2. We assume that Let sup v<w p(v; w) < p( For the second process we shall take 0 to be any con guration such that 0 (s) = w for all s 2 B 1 . In other words, 0 (s) > 0 implies 0 (s) = w . Thus 0 0 . Using the coupling of Theorem 6.1, it follows that if t converges almost surely to the con guration in which all players choose w , then the same is true for the f t g process.
To show that the f t g process converges, notice rst that it is monotone increasing; that is, t+1 t . To see this, observe that in the 0 con guration, no player wants to choose a lower strategy. The players who are most likely to want to move down are those inside, but at the very edge, of a B j . Such a player has fraction p of her neighbors choosing j ? 1 while she chooses j | the width of the rings was chosen to be large enough that the neighborhood of no player can intersect more than two rings. The hypothesis of the theorem requires that such a player will choose w > j ? 1, and so w must be at least j. Moving more towards the inner edge of any ring (or into B w ) just increases the distribution of neighbors' play in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance, and so the best response never falls as we move in towards the center. Next, notice that if no player wants to revise downward and one player revises upward, monotonicity of best response with respect to scochastic dominance implies that still no player will wish to revise downward. Thus the process is monotone increasing.
Consider now a limit con guration of the f t g process. It is a Nash con guration.
Furthermore, on each set B w is at least as big as w. Next we can see that (s) > 0 for all s exactly by the arguments of the proof of theorem 4.4: Near the border of the largest sphere contained in the set of all players for which (s) > 0, all players with revision opportunities confront mixtures of play in which no more than fraction p of their neighbors play 0. Hence they will want to switch. Thus in the limit this sphere must contain all of B(N). Now we see that is at least 2 on B 2 and at least 1 everywhere else.
Repeating the argument shows that must be at least 2 everywhere, and so on until we conclude that (s) w for all s.
So far we have shown that lim t!1 Prf t (s) w g = 1 for initial 0 which has all players in B w choosing w . Now run the same argument again, but with an initial condition which is w on some sphere B w , w + 1 on B w +1 =B w , and so forth. The conclusion is that lim t!1 Prf t (s) w g = 1 for any initial condition 0 such that all players in B w choose w . Thus it follows that for any initial condition 0 such that all players in B w B w are choosing w , lim t!1 Prf t (s) = w g = 1.
